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Abstract 
Throughout the last decades, employment rates of older workers in most European countries 
have been falling, as has the age of exit from the labour force. This development does not 
only exert heavy financial pressures on social security systems but inhibits also the potential 
of older workers to shape their lives actively. The reasons for that trend can be found at 
three dimensions: the early retirement options inherent in the public retirement system, the 
internalisation and externalisation strategies of enterprises, and the retirement preferences of 
individual workers.  
The paper will present recent empirical data on the way enterprises utilise early retirement 
options created by the public retirement system for externalising older workforce. The data 
was collected in expert interviews with personnel managers and works council members in 
Polish and German enterprises. Many of the studied companies are undergoing restructuring 
and are cutting employment levels. This clearly dominates their personnel policy towards 
older workforce. Therefore, externalisation strategies outbalance any possible tendencies to 
integrate older workers, like considering them to a greater extent in recruitment.  
The paper will also discuss the possible future development of externalisation strategies in 
the light of pension reforms carried out in Germany and Poland.  
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1 Introduction 
In many Continental European countries, a trend towards earlier exit from the labour market 
has established itself. Moreover, the last decades witnessed a drop in activity rates and 
employment rates of persons aged 50 and more. (In the following, that group of persons will 
be referred to as „older workers“.) At the same time, job-seeking ´50pluses´ encounter 
barriers if they want to re-enter the labour market.  
Poland and Germany are not spared this development. The downtrend in economic activity 
in higher age brackets confronts the social security systems in these countries with 
financing problems. It also inhibits the ability of older persons to shape their life according 
to their wishes in a twofold manner. On the one hand, older persons who exit the labour 
force before standard retirement age, are punished with a lower pension level due to pension 
deductions – or will be punished, in the case of Poles who will retire under the new pension 
system. Old-age pensions after unemployment and after Altersteilzeit (´part-time work in 
old age´; see explanation in next section) granted in Germany in the year 2003 amounted on 
average to 960 € per month after deduction of social security contributions and average 
pension reductions of 173 €; the old-age pension for newly retired women available at the 
age of 60 years amounted on average to 628 €, with average pension reductions of 78 € 
(Ruland 2004: 11). On the other hand, older people often exit the labour force involuntarily 
before standard retirement age due to bad health, downsizing or unfavourable working 
conditions, all of which may be subsumed under the concept of ´push factors´ (comp. 
Jensen/Kjeldgaard 2001: 2-3). This inhibits their ability to „make flexible choices in the way 
they spend time over life – in learning, in work, in leisure and in care-giving“ (OECD 
definition of „active ageing“, 1998: 84). 
The reasons for the trend towards early retirement can be analysed at individual level (with 
regard to retirement preferences), enterprise level (´push factors´), collective bargaining 
level (regulations which enable and induce early exit) and at statutory level (retirement 
incentives and disincentives) (comp. Naegele 2002: 213). This paper proceeds on the 
assumption that the labour force participation of older workers and the exit from the labour 
market depend on a complex arrangement of institutional, socio-economic and firm-based 
factors. The trend towards early exit will only be reversed if respective statutory measures, 
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especially in the field of pension policy, are translated into firm behaviour. In line with this 
assumption, the paper will deal with the ´translation´ process of statutory measures in the 
field of pension policy into respective externalisation strategies of companies. The impact 
thereupon of retirement preferences at micro-level, of meso-level collective bargaining 
policy, and of macro-level developments on the labour market and with regard to 
demographic conditions will not concern us here for reasons of space and clarity.1 
In the next chapter, the political framework of pension policy in Poland and Germany will 
be sketched, with focus on statutory early retirement options. Afterwards, I will present the 
results of qualitative interviews with personnel managers and/or works council members in 
Polish and German companies which were carried out in spring 2004 and spring 2005. The 
subject of those interviews were personnel policies towards older workers, especially 
policies pertaining to recruitment, working hours, further vocational qualification, health 
management and social benefits, as well as exit policies. The core part of the paper will be 
devoted to the interplay between statutory pension policies and personnel policies/exit 
policies of firms in respect of the outcome, i.e., the externalisation versus the retention of 
older workers. The subsequent section will recapitulate the findings in a comparative 
perspective. The last section will discuss the possible future developments of firms´ 
externalisation strategies in the light of pension reforms carried out in Germany and Poland. 
2 Statistics on Employment and Retirement 
A trend towards early exit from the labour market is visible in Poland and Germany. This 
can be inferred from the observation of two indicators across time: the average age of take-
up of an old-age pension (and to a lesser extent the age of take-up of a disability pension, as 
this does often not indicate complete withdrawal from the labour market), and the 
employment rates in higher age brackets.  
                                                     
1  With respect to methodological questions (qualitative analyses in firms), the focus on firm-level and 
the interest in institutional, structural and organisational factors, my work shows similarities with the 
approach of Naschold et al. (1994). The institutional arrangement in which German firms operate has 
however changed due to the successive curtailment of early exit opportunities pursuited by the German 
government since the mid-nineties.  
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In Germany, the average age of take-up of the old-age pension in 2002 was 62.6 years for 
men and 62.8 years for women (Table 1). This indicator has been on the rise since the year 
2000. In the case of disability pensions (Rente wegen verminderter Erwerbsfähigkeit), the 
average age of take-up was as low as 51.2 years (men) and 49.5 years (women), and is still 
decreasing.  
Table 1: Age of take-up of old-age pension and disability pension 
in Germany, 1960-2002 (blue-collar workers´, white-collar workers´ 
and miners´ pension scheme) 
Old-age pension Disability pension Year 
Men Women Men Women 
1960 65.2 63.9 55.8 56.2 
1965 65.4 63.9 57.1 57.6 
1970 65.2 63.3 57.7 59.0 
1975 64.1 63.0 56.3 59.2 
1980 62.6 61.9 54.7 57.7 
1985 62.7 62.9 53.8 54.3 
1990 62.8 63.5 53.9 52.6 
1995 62.3 62.5 52.8 50.9 
2000 62.2 62.3 52.3 50.2 
2002 62.6 62.8 51.2 49.5 
2003 62.9 62.9 50.7 49.2 
Source: VDR (2003: 113-114); newest data: www.vdr.de.  
From 1995 on, the data refers to unified Germany; before, to Western Germany. 
Before 1980, the average age was calculated without data from the miners´ pension scheme. 
 
Polish men retired in 2002 on average at the age of 59.4 years, and women at the age of 
56.1 years (Table 2). New male disability pensioners were in 2002 on average 47.4 years 
old, and new female disability pensioners 45.9 years old. Between 2002 and 2004, the 
average age of take-up of an old-age pension has decreased by 0.4 years (without 
consideration of the gender distinction), while the age of take-up of a disability pension has 
risen by almost a year.  
Table 2: Age of take-up of old-age pension and disability  
pension in Poland, 1992-2004 
Old-age pension Disability pension Year 
Total Men Women Total Men Women 
1992 57,0 59,0 55,0 46,0 47,0 45,0 
1995 56,9 59,0 55,1 45,5 46,2 44,7 
1999 57.6 59.2 56.7 46.9 47.3 46.2 
2000 57.0 58.9 55.9 46.6 47.1 45.8 
2001 57.1 59.4 56.0 46.7 47.3 45.8 
2002 57.2 59.4 56.1 46.8 47.4 45.9 
2004 56.8   47.6   
Source: ZUS (2004: 38, 39); ZUS (1997: 52-53); ZUS (2005: 1,7).  
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In international comparisons, the indicator ´average age of exit´ is often used instead of the 
´average factual age of retirement´ (comp. EC 2004; EC 2003). The reason is that in some 
public pension systems, it is possible to draw a pension and continue gainful employment 
(U.K.), while in others, a large time span may lie between exiting the labour force and 
taking up an old-age pension (Germany). The average age of exit in Germany and Poland as 
of 2002 lay below the retirement age – it was 61.1 years for men and 60.3 years for women 
in Germany, and 58.1 years for men and 55.8 years for women in Poland (EC 2004: 19). 
Available data does however not allow for a longitudinal analysis. 
The low retirement age/age of exit in Poland in Germany is reflected in low employment 
rates. In Germany, the employment rate of older men has dropped between 1970 and 2000, 
most pronounced in the age range 60-64 years – from 70 per cent to 28 per cent (Figure 1 in 
the appendix). Between 2000 and 2004, a slight rise of employment rates in the age groups 
55-59 and 60-64 could be noticed.  
The employment rate of German women aged 50-54 years and 55-59 years has increased in 
the same period, while the employment rate of 60-64-year-old women has fallen from 20 
per cent to twelve per cent (with an increase by 4 per cent until 2004; Figure 2 in the 
appendix).  
In Poland, the employment rates of older men and women have continuously fallen between 
1992 and 2004 (Figures 3 and 4 in the appendix).2 In the case of 60-64-year old Polish 
women, the drop was especially steep, from 22 per cent to 13 per cent. The decrease in the 
employment rate of Polish women occurred from a higher level then was the case with 
German women (22 per cent compared to ten per cent; Figure 4); in the same period, the 
employment rate of German women of the same age has climbed from 10 per cent to 16 per 
cent (Figure 2).  
Poland is much worse positioned than Germany as regards the fulfilment of the 50 per cent 
employment rate of the 55-65-year-olds and the rise of the age of exit from the labour 
market by five years as stipulated by Stockholm and Barcelona targets of the European 
Council (EC 2004). The above presented data also indicates that the prospects that those 
targets will be reached in near future look worse in Poland, especially in the light of the 
                                                     
2 Earlier Polish data is not comparable for lack of Labour Force Surveys and due to hidden but not 
officially acknowledged unemployment.  
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continuously descending factual retirement age and employment rates in higher age 
brackets.  
3 The Legal Framework of Retirement in Germany and Poland 
Besides of standard retirement, pension systems in Germany and Poland provide several 
´pathways of exit from work´. In line with Kohli/Rein (1991: 6-7), a ´pathway of exit´ 
denotes here “an institutional arrangement or – in most cases – a combination of different 
institutional arrangements that are sequentially linked to manage the transition process, 
that is, the period between exit from work and entry into the normal old-age pension 
system.“ The social security systems in both countries provide an unemployment pathway, a 
disability pathway, an occupational pension pathway or other firm-based early exit 
pathways. Thus, “early retirement” has to be distinguished from “exit from work”. The 
latter can occur at a later stage, as in some pensions systems, it is possible to compbine the 
receipt of an old-age pension with continued gainful employment, or at an earlier stage, via 
an early exit pathways. 
3.1  The Situation in Germany 
In Germany, the standard retirement age for men and women is 65 years.3 Severely 
handicapped persons receive a full pension at the age of 63 years. Persons with 35 years of 
contributions can retire at the age of 63 years (and at the age of 62 years, starting from 
2011), albeit with deductions. People who have been unemployed for at least 12 months 
upon completion of their 58th year and 6 months, and people who have participated in 
Altersteilzeit or at least two years, can retire at the age of 63 years with deductions (SGB 
VI, §237). Next to the old-age pension scheme for blue- and white-collar workers, various 
professional schemes exist which have different retirement ages, e.g., the age of 60 for 
soldiers, fireworkers, civil servants in penitentiaries and policemen.4  
                                                     
3 With exceptions for women born before 1952 who can retire at age 60 with deductions of up to 18 per 
cent of pension income. 
4 An overview of the different systems of German old-age security can be found in Deutscher Bundestag 
(2001). 
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Until February 2006, people aged 55 and older who have been employed for 36 months or 
more were entitled for the earnings-related unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosengeld I) for a 
period of up to 32 months; all subsequent work relationships will establish a right for a 
maximum receipt period of 18 months (SGB III, §434l). The exemption of benefit 
recipients aged 58 and older from the obligation to actively seek work was recently 
prolonged by two years and will be in force until the end of 2007 (SGB III, §428). For a 
long time, those two measures constituted the framework for the ´unemployment pathway´ 
of early exit in the form of the so-called ´58 (or 57) rule´. Companies which dismissed older 
workers paid them generous severance payments to bridge the time until first receipt of 
unemployment benefit which was then drawn until the start of retirement.5 Due to the risen 
age of entry into the old-age pension after unemployment and Altersteilzeit by law of July 
2004 (Law on the Sustainability of the Public Pension System, see Steffen 2005: 46-47), the 
unemployment pathway now starts at the age of 60 years and 4 months (or 61 years and 6 
months after January 2006, due to the shortened receipt period of unemployment benefit) 
instead of 57 years and 4 months.  
Similarly to the unemployment pathway, access to the ´disability pathway´ was restricted by 
force of a law of 2001. No disability pension is awarded if the applicant is incapable of 
working in his/her previous profession and if he/she is able to work at least six hours daily. 
Applicants with work ability of at least three hours and less than six hours daily are granted 
a partial pension unless there are no part-time jobs available on the labour market. 
Disability pensions are awarded only for three years, but may be prolonged if the work 
incapacity continues. Persons who were newly granted a disability pension between the age 
of 60 and 63 years see their pension income diminished by 3.6 per cent per year (SGB VI, 
§43).  
Altersteilzeit is an institutionalised early exit pathway which sets in at firm level and is 
financed partly by the Employment Office and partly by the enterprises. It can be utilised in 
the ´part-time model´, i.e. the worker aged 55 or older reduces his/her working hours for the 
whole duration of Altersteilzeit (ten years, at the maximum, and two years at the minimum); 
or in the ´blocked model´, which is utilised far more frequently. The worker then works 
                                                     
5 The obligation of employers to pay back the unemployment benefit for long-standig workers aged 55 or 
more is codified in SGB III, § 147a was a barrier to that practice. Teipen (2003: 87-88) however 
assesses that there were many opportunities to escape that obligation. This obligation expired by 
February 2006. 
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his/her usual working hours in the first half of the Altersteilzeit period and enters the ´free 
time phase´ in the other half. During the whole phase, the worker receives at least 70 per 
cent of his/her usual earnings. The Employment Office reimburses the employer for the 20 
per cent increase on earnings for the factual part-time work if an unemployed person or an 
apprentice with completed vocational education fills the ensuing vacancy. New entries into 
Altersteilzeit are possible only till the end of 2009. Due to the raised earliest age of take-up 
of the old-age pension after unemployment and Altersteilzeit, and due to the fact that 
employers utilising Altersteilzeit are now obliged to conclude an insurance against 
insolvency, it can be assumed that this early exit option has lost much of its appeal for 
workers and enterprises alike. 
Occupational pensions do not constitute a pathway of early exit in Germany. As a rule, they 
do not compensate for a lower level of public pension, and higher public pensions often go 
along with higher occupational pension levels (Deutscher Bundestag 2001: 85). 
Occupational pensions usually constitute an instrument of retention of ´high potentials´ and 
not an incentive to retire early (Deutscher Bundestag 2001: 85), all the more as the timing 
of receipt of the occupational pensions is bound to the receipt of a public old-age pension 
(BetrAVG, modified by law of 2002, §6).  
The timing of the qualitative interviews in German companies (spring 2004), which form 
the basis for this paper, ruled out the option to address issues which were decided by 
political actors several months later, like the raising of the pensionable age after 
unemployment and Altersteilzeit. Besides of the utilisation of Altersteilzeit and other early 
exit pathways grounded in enterprise-level regulations, the interviews addressed plans and 
forecasts as to the firms´ future exit policies in the light of the expiry of Altersteilzeit and 
the planned raising of the standard retirement age to 67 years.6 It showed, however, that 
enterprises were concerned with present day issues and only a few had plans for the time 
´after Altersteilzeit´, therefore the discussion of those issues had a very hypothetical 
character. I will however analyse possible future development of firms´ externalisation 
strategies in the last chapter.  
                                                     
6 The contract of the new governing coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD stipulates that the retirement age 
will rise stepwise between 2012 and 2035 to 67 years (Bundesregierung 2005: 82). 
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3.2  The Situation in Poland 
The standard retirement age in Poland is 60 years for women and 65 years for men. In 2004, 
the government endeavoured to raise the retirement age of women to the retirement age of 
men in in six-month steps between 2014 and 2024 for financial and gender equality reasons. 
As several parliamentary fractions and the social partners disapproved of this step, in 
August 2004, the Polish government abstained from this reform measure and postponed the 
discussion on the retirement age for women into the future (MPS 2005: 27).7  
The old pension system in Poland provided early retirement pensions for women and certain 
occupational groups. Those early retirement options are reserved for persons born till 
December, 31st 1948, i.e. to those who were 50 years old or older at the time of the pension 
reform, and to those who will have fulfilled the entitlement conditions by December 31st, 
2006. Women may retire at the age of 55 years after 30 years of contributions (this option 
will be valid till the end of 2008), or after 20 years of contributions if disabled. Disabled 
men can retire at the age of 60 years after a 25-year contribution history. Civil servants, 
teachers, railworkers and people performing work ´of special character or under special 
conditions´ (e.g., soldiers, firemen, journalists) can retire at age 55 (women) and 60 (men), 
dancers even at the age of 40/45 years, musicians and miners at the age of 50/55 years 
(Tymorek 1999). All these options will be closed for persons retiring under the new pension 
system, which was introduced in 1999. The Polish government originally planned to replace 
early retirement options for certain groups of workers with ´bridging pensions´ which 
would require an additional contribution paid by the employer. In July 2005, the Parliament 
postponed this reform by two years until the end of 2007. Moreover, miners were successful 
in protests fought out in front of the Parliament – their early retirement option will be 
prolonged without time restrictions.  
Besides of those early retirement pensions, the unemployment pathway of early exit can be 
utilised in Poland. Companies which experience an economic downturn, which undergo 
restructuring, or which close certain departments or workplaces may pull through their 
                                                     
7 The public opinion in 2004 similarly rejected the idea of adjusting the retirement age of women to that 
of men – 77 per cent of respondents of an opinion poll conducted in Poland in 2002 viewed the gender-
differentiated retirement age as „just“, and 58 per cent regarded the governmental proposal to raise the 
retirement age for women as a wrong decision (CBOS 2002: 4-5).  
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dismissed personnel with the help of pre-retirement benefits (świadczenia 
przedemerytalne). Women can receive those benefits from the age of 55 years or after a 35-
year work history, and men at the age of 60 years or after 40 years of job tenure. In August 
2004, those benefits were reduced and now consist of a lump-sum payment of 670 złoty 
(about 165 €).  
The disability pathway to early retirement is not as easy to enter now as before the reform 
of 1996. That reform restricted disability pensions (now called „pensions in cases of 
incapacity for work“) to people whose ability to work has diminished and not to those who 
have solely suffered detriments to health (Czepulis-Rutkowska 1996: 196-197). This reform 
started producing results in 1999. The number of first-time recipients of work incapacity 
pensions fell from 318,669 persons in 1991 to 171,673 in 1995 and 69,565 in 2002 (ZUS 
1997: 37, ZUS 2004: 23). Still, Poland occupies one of the leading positions with regard to 
the number of disability pensioners per 1,000 persons – 200 pensioners as compared to 66 
pensioners in Germany in 2002 (Trafiałek 2003: 232).  
The respondents of qualitative interviews conducted in Polish firms were uncertain as to the 
further development of the Polish pension system and perceived a similar uncertainty on the 
side of the employees. This situation of ambiguity is aggravated by inconsistent decisions 
made by the legislator, e.g. with regard to miners´ pensions. If follows from this that most 
of the studied Polish firms do not have plans in what form, and whether at all they will 
continue their current externalisation practice. Therefore, the section on Polish case studies 
will picture the current and the past developments of the interplay between retirement 
policy and enterprise regulations; the last chapter, in turn, will cover the speculative, future-
oriented part of the analysis.  
4 The Interplay of Statutory Retirement Policies and Firms´ Exit 
Policies 
4.1  Description of the Survey Sample 
In spring 2004, I conducted qualitative interviews with personnel managers and/or works 
council members in 14 companies in Northern Germany. Qualitative interviews with mostly 
personnel managers in 17 firms in Southern Poland followed in spring 2005. My sampling 
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criteria were size of firm (above 250 employees, which complies with the EU criterion for 
“big firm”), operation on the national or international (and not only local) market, and share 
of older workers among the workforce of at least ten per cent. I concentrated on 
manufacturing sectors as I assumed that the pressure on early exit (stemming, among others, 
from health reasons) will be higher among blue-collar workers. The sample was not meant 
to be representative. 
The following issues were covered in the firm-level interviews: 
- impact of demographic change on the firm; solutions to that; 
- problems or chances connected to older workers (50+) or to the ageing of the firm´s 
workforce; 
- working conditions for blue- and white-collar workers, chances to reach statutory 
retirement age at one´s workplace; 
- personnel strategy towards older workers; in detail: recruitment, further vocational 
education, flexibilisation of working time, health management; 
- any differences in personnel policy measures for older and younger workers (e.g., age 
limits for certain occupations); 
- exit routes of older workers from the firm; 
- changes in the firm´s exit policy in last 10-15 years; 
- impact of pension reforms on the firm´s exit and personnel policy; 
- occupational pensions, rules in case of early take-up; 
- suggestions for political actors: What would help the firm to recruit and retain more 
older workers? 
4.2  Findings from German Case Studies8 
In Table 2, the 14 German firms are portrayed in which I conducted qualitative interviews 
in spring 2004.  
                                                     
8 This section draws on Aleksandrowicz/Hinrichs 2004. It is written in the present tense but depicts the 
situation at the time of the interview (spring 2004).  
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Table 2: FIRMS SURVEYED IN NORTHERN GERMANY, SPRING 2004 
ALIAS 
SECTION of 
econ. activity 
(based on main 
activity) acc. to 
ISIC 
No. of 
EMPLOYEES 
(rounded off) 
(2003) 
% of workers „50 
PLUS“ at studied 
site (2003) 
AVERAGE AGE of 
workers at studied 
site (2003) 
Legal FORM 
OF FIRM; 
ownership 
INTERVIEWEE(S) 
Firm DE-1 Public 
Administration a. 
Defence 
2,000 (2002) 29% at age 46-55, 
12.7% at age 56-65 
(2002) 
not specified Public 
administration 
Personnel managers 
Firm DE-2 Financial 
Intermediation 
1,000 20.1% 40,5 years Public body Personnel manager 
Firm DE-3 Man. of Basic 
Metals a. 
Fabricated Metal 
Products 
4,300 27.2% 
 
41,3 years Limited liability 
company 
Works council 
members 
Firm DE-4 Compulsory Social 
Security  
300 (2004) 12% (2004) 37,5 years Public body Personnel manager 
Firm DE-5 Man. of Transport 
Equipment 
3,200 (11,200 
Germany-wide) 
21.5% (Germany-
wide) 
46 years Limited liability 
company 
Works council 
members 
Firm DE-6 Man. of Food 
Products, 
Beverages a. 
Tobacco 
700 22.6% at age 45-54, 
19.8% at age 55+ 
n.s. Stock 
corporation; 
private 
ownership 
Works council 
member, personnel 
manager 
Firm DE-7, 
Firm DE-8 
(two sites of 
one firm) 
Man. of Food 
Products, 
Beverages a. 
Tobacco 
4,400 (2004; 
Germany-wide) 
25.5% 
(2004; Germany-
wide) 
41,75 years 
(Germany-wide) 
Limited liability 
company 
Persons responsible 
for ageing issues 
Firm DE-9 Man. of Food 
Products, 
Beverages a. 
Tobacco 
1,200 19.6% at age 51+ 39,3 years Limited 
partnership 
company 
Works council 
members, personnel 
manager 
Firm DE-10  Man. of Transport 
Equipment 
16,000 14% at age 51+ 
 
41,1 years Stock 
corporation; 
private 
ownership 
Person responsible 
for ageing issues 
Firm DE-11 Man. of Food 
Products, 
Beverages a. 
Tobacco 
900 23.8% at age 51+ 
 
44 years Combined 
limited liability 
and limited 
partnership 
company (GmbH 
& Co. KG) 
Works council 
members, personnel 
manager 
Firm DE-12 Man. of Electrical 
a. Optical 
Equipment 
700 (at two sites) 44.4% 
 
47 years Limited liability 
company 
Personnel managers 
Firm DE-13 
(several 
affiliated 
firms) 
Electricity, Gas a. 
Water Supply 
2,700 17.8% at age 50+ 
 
39,9 years Stock 
corporation, 
private 
ownership 
Works council 
members 
Firm DE-14 Man. of Transport 
Equipment 
1,100 (2004) 34.9% at age 50+ 
(2002) 
46 years (2002) Limited liability 
company 
Personnel manager 
In Germany, public pensions are by far the largest component in an average retirement 
income package. It composes 82.3 per cent of gross income of pensioners in Western 
Germany and 95.8 per cent in Eastern Germany (Schmähl 2002: 14). Therefore, changes to 
the pension level, eligibility criteria or pensionable age are of immediate importance to 
employees and have a great impact on the decision about (early) retirement. Since the 
introduction of the flexible retirement age in 1972, early retirement in Germany has become 
a universal phenomenon. Starting from the end of the nineties, the government has been 
enacting laws which aim at reversing this trend (for a thorough analysis of those measures, 
see e.g. Gruber/Wise 1999; Viebrok 2001; or Hinrichs 2003). 
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Employers´ exit policies are crucial for the success or failure of governmental policies 
aimed at prolonging working life. An official from the Federal Employers´ Association, 
which popularises know-how on ´active ageing´ policies among member companies, 
argued, however, in an interview that the adjustment of personnel policies to the changed 
statutory restrictions and opportunities was often thwarted by the concentration of firms on 
short-term strategic planning and by immediate market performance problems which 
resulted in personnel cuts (interview carried out in October, 2003). 
With regard to the adaptation strategies of German enterprises to pension reforms, the 
following direction of changes can be discerned: 
1) firms adapt their exit policies to changes entailed by pension reforms – they close 
down early retirement pathways, make them less favourable for workers – and/or 
adjust their personnel policy towards older workers so as to enable a longer working 
life; or 
2) firms sustain their exit policies or open up new early retirement pathways. 
The impact of pension reforms at firm level becomes visible in agreements between the 
works council and management and in actual practice. It was not possible to describe a 
firm´s practice as always strictly in line with point 1) or point 2) above as enacted changes 
were often piecemeal; there were cases where one field of personnel policy was changed in 
order to allow for a prolonged working life, but at the same time, another pathway of early 
exit was opened. Interviews showed that besides institutional changes, numerous other 
factors have an impact on firms´ personnel policy towards older workers and on their 
externalisation: changed provisions in collective agreements, firm culture, globalisation, 
economic pressure, or changed retirement preferences of elderly workforce. 
Changes which correspond to the legislator´s interest in reversing the trend towards early 
retirement (point 1) above) can e.g. entail the closing-down of early retirement pathways, 
the adjustment of the earliest age of entry into Altersteilzeit in firm-specific agreements and 
collective agreements and the improvement of working conditions so as to enable work 
until retirement.  
The firm sample did not include ´best practice´ examples of firms with age(ing)-friendly 
measures like those listed in Walker/Taylor (1998) or Bertelsmann Stiftung ... (2003). 
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However, two firms (Firm DE-7 and Firm DE-10) have established a project group which 
fosters age management. In a few other firms, moderate changes in the direction of a longer 
working life have been introduced. To start with the latter, moderately changed access rules 
to Altersteilzeit were enacted at a vehicle-manufacturing company. The alterations are a 
result of the pension reform of 2004 which raised the age for take-up of pension after 
Altersteilzeit from 60 to 63 years. At Firm DE-14, the works council agreement on 
Altersteilzeit was modified at the time of the interview so as to take account of the higher 
retirement age; the agreement will then allow for entry into Altersteilzeit upon completion 
of the 57th year at the earliest (whereas it was possible to enter into Altersteilzeit at the age 
of 55 before). 
Firm DE-7 is an example how pension reforms and the awareness of demographic change 
might (in future) influence not only exit policy, but also other areas of personnel policy. 
Within the firm, a ´diversity council´ tries to raise awareness of the ageing issue at all firm 
sites. The interviewed members of the diversity council feel an immediate call for action as 
in the next 5-15 years, about one fourth of the workforce will have left the company 
because of reaching retirement age. In spring 2004, the project group was at the stage of 
developing concepts to prevent know-how losses which might come as the result of that 
massive exit process, to prevent burn-out of older workers, e.g. of assembly line workers, 
and to restore their motivation.  
Firm DE-10 addresses the aspect of ageing at all functional levels of the company. The 
managers realised that the average age of the workforce which was 40,3 years in 2002 will 
rise to 47,5 years by 2010 – provided the company fails to hire apprentices, there are no 
programmes to secure the inflow of new workers, no Altersteilzeit and no early retirement 
before the age of 63. This recognition triggered in 2003 the set-up of the ´strategic initiative 
ageing workforce´ at every German site of the enterprise in question. The co-ordinator of 
the initiative on ageing workforce explained: “There is a growing awareness within the firm 
that our staff is ageing.” Within the strategy on the ageing workforce at that firm, measures 
have been developed which set in at almost all functional levels of the company: the 
ergonomic reorganisation of workplaces in a new production hall, preventive health 
management, further vocational qualification, age-mixed personnel placement and sheltered 
workplaces. At the same time, the company is orientated towards stopping the ageing of the 
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workforce by attracting junior staff and apprentices. Thus, the managers still regard the 
option of early retirement as indispensable. 
In contrast to the above presented firms which have partly enacted changes that might in the 
future allow for a prolongation of working life, some studied German enterprises have not 
responded to pension reforms in a way as to allow for a prolonged working life (point 2 
above). Some companies still define the age of 60 as the preferable age of entry for workers 
in Altersteilzeit. In the case of a vehicle manufacturer, the works council agreement 
determines the duration of Altersteilzeit in relation to the age of entry into this contract. In 
practice, the management complies to the wishes of individual workers to exceed this 
period and e.g. to enter into the “free time phase” at the age of 60 (Firm DE-5). In 
distinction to this, the personnel manager at another vehicle-manufacturing company 
explained that an orientation of the workforce towards a later exit from employment is ruled 
out by a provision in the works council agreement which prescribes the earliest possible 
entry into retirement (Firm DE-10).  
Some developments in the studied German firms point to a continuation of the early 
retirement practice. A few firms have introduced alternatives to Altersteilzeit or are 
planning to continue this or similar options on firm level (thus, without reimbursements 
from the Employment Office) which makes them quite costly instruments. Several 
interviewees reported that they would appreciate a follow-up model after the expiry of 
Altersteilzeit but see this as the legislator´s purview. A vehicle-manufacturing firm has 
introduced lifetime work accounts, which shall bridge the time to retirement with earnings 
resulting from accumulated but not yet rewarded hours of work. The group council 
agreement (valid for the whole corporate group) on long-term work accounts states that 
“instruments which generate workplaces take priority over instruments which prolong the 
working time”. I.e., if workers work overtime when there are young, they shall retire early 
in order to reach the collectively agreed working hours on average (Firm DE-5). 
The aim of the legislator to stop the trend towards early retirement is also thwarted by firms 
which conduct mass layoffs. Four of the surveyed firms were cutting staff levels at the time 
of the interview and one of them had finished staff reductions by then. In all cases, it was a 
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mass layoff.9 In the studied firms, older workers with a long job tenure are protected against 
dismissals by most collective agreements concluded at the branch level. They also enjoy 
special protection in cases of layoffs. Nevertheless, the qualitative interviews showed that 
older workers are the main target of staff reductions and that German companies make use 
of early retirement options even if the legal foundations of such measures are becoming less 
favourable for firms and for workers alike. The research results point to a continuation of 
policies already unravelled by Gatter/Hartmann (1995: 418). In companies studied by the 
scholars, early retirees amounted from 30 to 50 per cent of all released workers.  
There are some signs that the practice of releasing older workers will change in the future. 
The personnel manager at a vehicle-manufacturing company believed that the release of 
older workers would become too costly because of pension reforms and higher taxes on 
compensation payments. The enterprise in question will then have to resort to dismissals of 
younger workers. The manager feared that this would bring the age structure of the 
workforce out of balance (Firm DE-14). Firms´ recognition that older workers are carriers 
of firm-specific knowledge and expertise could also bring about a change in exit policy. On 
the other side, restrictions to the legal protection against dismissals which are on the 
political agenda of the CDU could pose older workers at a greater risk to be dismissed. As it 
is now, the protection of older workers against dismissals codified in labour law and agreed 
in collective bargaining helps to secure higher employment rates of the elderly, except in 
cases of mass layoffs which resort on great scale to early retirement options.  
Irrespective of branch affiliation, market position and size, the surveyed German firms have 
some similar traits as regards their exit policies. Firstly, the age of 60 is the implicit upper 
age limit for exit from employment. Secondly, early retirement measures are used in all 14 
firms. 10 firms have a collective agreement (branch-wide or at single-plant level) on 
Altersteilzeit. Two firms offer Altersteilzeit in singular cases on the basis of the legal 
regulation. Three firms release workers at the age of 57 years who then bridge the time till 
retirement with unemployment benefit (´57 rule´). One firm finished the release of workers 
aged 53 years and older with the help of generous severance payments as part of a 
restructuring process carried out before the time of the interview. (In the meanwhile, the 
utilisation of this so-called „57 rule“ was curtailed out due to the shortened receipt period of 
                                                     
9 According to the German definition, a mass layoff is a staff reduction which is taking place at the 
initiative of the employer and concerns at least 10 per cent of the workforce (in case of firms with up 
to 499 workers) or at least 30 workers (in the case of bigger firms; Bröckermann 1997: 402, 404). 
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the unemployment benefit.) Those early retirement measures meet both workers´ and firms´ 
expectations. The firms´ interest is in the first place to reduce staff levels and to rejuvenate 
the work force. The workers´ interest is to escape unfavourable working conditions and to 
enjoy free time while at the same time receiving up to 90 per cent of former wages (in case 
of Altersteilzeit). Thirdly, Altersteilzeit or other modes of early exit are offered by almost all 
of the studied firms, but none of them uses it according to the initial aim of the legislator to 
allow for a ´smooth transition into retirement , i.e. in the ´part-time model´. The ´blocked 
model´ of Altersteilzeit is preferred by older workers and by firm management alike. And 
fourthly, all studied branch agreements define the age of 65 as the age of exit from 
employment. However, the statutory retirement age as a chronological marker for entering 
the “third phase” of life and the factual exit behaviour of workers fall apart as was noticed 
by Kohli/Rein (1991: 22): “The transition to retirement has become longer and fuzzier, but 
it still is a transition between two very distinct states“. Judging from the interviews in 
German firms, workers begin to orientate themselves towards early exit already at the age 
of 55 years, the earliest age of entry into Altersteilzeit. Above the age of 60, there is hardly 
any worker left in the 14 surveyed firms.  
 
4.3  Findings from Polish Case Studies 
In Poland, I have conducted interviews in 17 companies, mostly with personnel managers or 
administrative workers, in one case also with a trade unionist. Table 3 contains most 
important data on the firms, their branch affiliation and workforce structure by age.  
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Table 3: FIRMS SURVEYED IN SOUTHERN POLAND, SPRING 2005 
ALIAS SETION of econ. 
activity (based on 
main activity) acc. 
to ISIC 
No. of 
EMPLOYEES 
(rounded off) 
(2005) 
% of workers 
„50 PLUS“ at 
studied site 
(2005) 
AVERAGE AGE 
of workers at 
studied site (2005) 
Legal FORM OF 
FIRM; ownership 
INTERVIEWEE(S) 
Firm PL-1 Transport, Storage 
a. Communication 
1,600 15% n.s. Public body Personnel manager 
Firm PL-2 Man. of Food 
Products, 
Beverages a. 
Tobacco 
400 21,5% n.s. Co-operative Personnel manager 
Firm PL-3 Man. of Food 
Products, 
Beverages a. 
Tobacco 
400 13% 35 years Limited liability 
company  
CEO  
Firm PL-4 Man. of Machinery 
and Equipment 
n.e.c. 
2,300 13,3% 41 years Stock corporation, 
mixed ownership 
Financial manager 
Firm PL-5 Man. of Rubber 
and Plastic 
Products; Real 
Estate, Renting and 
Business Activities, 
Consulting 
400 (2004) 21,3% (2004) n.s. Sole proprietorship 
company; private 
ownership 
Personnel manager 
Firm PL-6 Man. of Basic 
Metals a. 
Fabricated Metal 
Products; Man. of 
Other Non-metallic 
Mineral Prod. 
600 (2004) 8% (approx.) 40 years Stock corporation, 
mostly private 
ownership 
Personnel manager 
Firm PL-7 Construction 300 (at two sites) 42,3% (at main 
site), including 6 
persons above 
the age of 64 
years 
47,5 y. – white-
collar-w.; 45,5 y. – 
blue-collar w. (at 
main site) 
Stock corporation, 
mixed private and 
public ownership 
Personnel manager 
Firm PL-8 Public 
Administration a. 
Defence; 
Electricity, Gas a. 
Water Supply 
800 32,5% at age 51+ 
(2004) 
45,4 years (2004) Stock corporation, 
public ownership 
Personnel manager 
Firm PL-9 Electricity, Gas a. 
Water Supply 
600 (2004) 29,5% (2004) 45 years Stock corporation, 
mixed private and 
public ownership 
Personnel manager 
Firm PL-10 Man. of Chemicals, 
Chemical Products 
a. Man-made 
Fibres 
200 18,6% n.s. Stock corporation; 
private ownership 
Personnel manager, 
trade unionist 
Firm PL-11 Man. of Transport 
Equipment 
400 36,3% at age 51+ 45,7 years (2004) Stock corporation; 
mostly private 
ownership 
Personnel manager 
Firm PL-12 Man. of Transport 
Equipment 
600 14,1% at age 51+ 
(2004) 
42,8 years Limited liability 
company 
Personnel manager, 
administrative 
workers (in short) 
Firm PL-13 Man. of Chemicals, 
Chemical Products 
and Man-made 
Fibres 
800 18,9% at age 51+ 41,1 years Stock corporation; 
private ownership 
Administrative 
worker, personnel 
manager 
Firm PL-14 Man. of Transport 
Equipment 
500 n.s. 42 years (2004) Limited liability 
company; private 
ownership 
Personnel manager 
Firm PL-15 Man. of Transport 
Equipment 
500 21,1% at age 51+ 40,7 years – 
women,  
38,2 years - men 
Limited liability 
company, private 
ownership 
Personnel manager 
Firm PL-16 Man. of Food 
Products, Bev. a. 
Tobacco 
200 22,8% at age 51+ n.s. (2002: 45 
years) 
Stock corporation; 
private ownership 
Personnel manager 
Firm PL-17 Electricity, Gas a. 
Water Supply 
800 26,5% at age 51+ 45 years (2004; 
approx.) 
Stock corporation, 
mixed private and 
public ownership  
Personnel manager 
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Seven of 17 Polish firms surveyed in spring 2005 were in the process of downsizing at the 
time of the interview or finished it shortly before, and one firm had respective plans for the 
nearest future. ´Active labour shedding´ means that the firm induces workers to grasp exit 
options, e.g., early retirement pensions or attractive compensation payments, dismisses 
certain workers or, in the most severe case, conducts mass layoffs10. With the exception of 
the expansive Firm PL-3 and of Firm PL-14 which has kept about the same level of workers 
for the last ten years, all other firms have diminished staff levels over the last years, if not 
with active measures like those described above, then passively, by reliance on „natural“ 
ways of exit like retirement, and by putting a freeze on hiring new staff.  
If we apply the distinction between the two types of firms´ reactions to pension reforms 
described in the section 4.2., it can be stated that Polish firms do not open up new early 
retirement pathways, which would thwart the aim of the legislator to reverse the trend 
towards early retirement (strategy 2). Polish firms in the sample do however set incentives 
for the usage of still available early retirement pensions and of the pre-retirement benefits 
and apply enlarged severance payments as a bridge between the (consensual) release of an 
older worker and the take-up of an old-age pension, early retirement pensions or pre-
retirement benefit. Polish severance payments are much lower than those applied by 
German firms, they do therefore not constitute a separate early exit pathway like the 
German „57 rule“. Whether Polish enterprises adapt their exit policies to changes entailed 
by pension reforms (strategy 1) can not be assessed yet, as early retirement pensions have 
not yet expired, and the replacement of early retirement pensions for people performing 
work „of a special character or under special conditions“ with so-called ´bridging pensions´ 
is still vague. What could be observed in the firm case studies, however, is how Polish firms 
deal with a situation when older workers refuse to leave on pre-retirement benefits which 
were reduced in 2004. 
I will start again with the description of firms´ exit policies and personnel policies which 
correspond with the aim of the legislator to impede early exit. Some firms (e.g. Firm PL-1, 
Firm PL-2, Firm PL-6, Firm PL-16), described by the interviewed personnel manager as 
„social“, attach importance to the protection of their workers, also of those incapable of 
                                                     
10 Mass layoffs occur, according to Polish law, in cases when within a month, at least 10 per cent of 
workers in a firm with less than 300 workers are released, or at least 30 workers in a firm with 300 and 
more workers (Patulski et al. 2004: 62).  
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working, from unemployment and from low pension levels. This is relevant in the context 
of the worsened conditions of receipt of pre-retirement benefits. Those firms which have 
recently finished downsizing are willing to retain workers if they do not want to leave on 
pre-retirement benefits. The personnel manager in Firm PL-2 observed that some workers 
had received information from the Social Insurance Institution on accumulated old-age 
pension income, which proved too low to make a living, therefore the employer assented to 
their wish to continue working until standard retirement age. (This dilemma will increase in 
future as pensions under the new system will depend to a greater extent on the length of the 
contribution period.) The personnel manager of Firm PL-2 assumes that after the expiry of 
early retirement pensions which are only available for persons retiring under the old system, 
the employer will likewise allow for continued employment. However, this specific dairy 
plant does neither have plans how to retain workers with health impediments, nor are there 
sheltered workplaces for persons which have lost the ability to perform their usual tasks, 
although, according to the personnel manager, physically straining labour in production 
departments is a barrier to employment until standard retirement age. Thus, the adaptation 
to pension reforms in that company happens in a passive way, without grasping 
opportunities to actively shape personnel policies for workers of all ages, e.g. through the 
improvement of working conditions. This pattern of reaction occurs also in other firms 
employing older workers. However, many interviewees stated that, as a result of recently 
finished staff reductions, there were hardly any workers left who were entitled to pre-
retirement benefits (i.e., women aged at least 55 and men at least 60, or women with a 
contribution period of 35 years, respectively 40 years).  
A heavy industrial enterprise is an example of a firm where the adaptation to pension 
reforms goes beyond the willingness to retain older workers. Although the personnel 
manager admitted that age management had been unknown territory to him before, the firm 
has designed some personnel measures which will eventually benefit workers of all ages. 
Far from introducing advanced health management measures like those applied in some 
German firms, Firm PL-15 nevertheless aspires to extend company health care provision 
beyond measures required by law (like regular health check-ups). The firm plans to cover 
all workers with free medical treatment by privately paid physicians (who have in Poland a 
better reputation than CHI physicians) and to introduce preventive measures. Those 
measures will address health risks connected to individual behaviour – diseases of the 
musculoskeletal system, smoking and drinking. The personnel manager hoped this would 
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improve the health status of the next generation of older workers in the firm. Another 
chance that in future, people in pre-retirement age will be able to continue work in this 
enterprise stems from constant advancements with regard to occupation safety and health as 
required by law. As safety at work in Polish enterprises starts from a much lower level than 
in Germany, there is still potential for improvement. The personnel manager contrasted the 
current safety at work with the situation at the company 20 years ago; at that time, accidents 
at work were quite common.  
Several other personnel managers, mostly from firms with large production departments 
and a high share of blue-collar workers, pointed to technological change as a chance for 
improvement of safety at work (e.g., Firm PL-7, Firm PL-8, Firm PL-9, Firm PL-17). In 
Firm PL-8, a communal utility company, the conversion from coal as the main energy 
source to clean sources like gas and electricity has improved working conditions for 
workers. As in Firm PL-8, the disability pathway is the second frequent exit route of older 
workers (after exit at standard retirement age), this technological change might diminish the 
occurrence of disability pensions. 
Further vocational qualification and the promotion of extramural university education of 
employees were named as other fields of action which support the continued employment of 
older workers as a by-product (Firm PL-10, Firm PL-15, Firm PL-16, PL-17). However, not 
in all cases vocational qualification is pursued in a systematic fashion. According to the 
personnel manager of a utility company, further vocational qualification at his firm is not 
contingent on age. Especially training in soft skills and in hands-on skills is of use to older 
workers, both within the company and if they aspire to open up their own businesses. „It 
happens that we train people only few years below retirement age, provided the person will 
profit from the newly acquired skills“, the interviewee explained the objectives of this 
policy (Firm PL-17).  
Contradicting the aim of the legislator to stop the early exit trend, Polish firms encourage 
and support the utilisation of early retirement and of pre-retirement by financial means. 
Firm PL-1, a postal authority, responds to the wishes of older workers who are not eligible 
for early retirement pensions by cancelling the employment contract. That way, the worker 
may apply for pre-retirement benefits which are only granted if the work relationship was 
cancelled by the employer. Firm PL-1 and Firm PL-2 promote people prior to retirement 
age to higher positions more quickly and raise their salary so as to secure them a higher 
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pension under the old pension system. A higher salary is also reflected in higher 
compensation payments granted to retirees. As the personnel manager in a utility company 
put it: „In our firm, it is profitable to retire, because we have very high compensation 
payments, and we also have jubilee awards paid out every five years“ (Firm PL-8). In cases 
workers do not intend to leave the company after reaching retirement age, the personnel 
manager tries to convince them to do so. Her decision is motivated by the wish to secure 
workplaces for younger workers and by the need to cut staffing levels. Similar situations 
(employees working past retirement age and then encouraged to leave the firm) occurred in 
Firm PL-16 as well. In many other studied firms, workers are encouraged to leave the firm 
in pre-retirement age. Vague political plans on the replacement of early retirement options 
with bridging pensions, and the uncertainty as to the further development of pre-retirement 
benefits create a situation of ambiguity in Poland. The personnel manager of a construction 
company encouraged workers to leave on pre-retirement benefits before the conditions for 
receipt have deteriorated: „We [..] persuaded them to leave. Because we have realised that 
later on, we might have no more jobs for them. And then, they would leave on worse 
conditions“ (Firm PL-7). That way, the situation of uncertainty created by the legislator due 
to contradicting political decisions on the future development of early exit options, 
constitutes a disincentive to a prolonged working life. 
In cases of mass layoffs and smaller personnel reductions, Polish and German firms resort 
to all available early retirement options and pathways of early exit provided by the state. 
The personnel manager of a Polish dairy company expressed this phenomenon with the 
following words: „The retirement system determines the means of cancelling the 
employment contract in a situation when staff levels have to be cut“ (Firm PL-2). Releasing 
people who have an entitlement to an early retirement pension is regarded as ´painless´ 
(Firm PL-2), ´natural´ (Firm PL-6) and ´humane´ (Firm PL-11). Firm PL-2 has conducted 
personnel reductions after the acquisition of several smaller companies. Workers with 
entitlement for an early retirement pension for people performing work „under special 
conditions or of a special character“ (among others, heavy labourers) and for pre-retirement 
pensions, have been approached in order to avoid mass layoffs. This pattern – first 
´humane´ release of older workers, then mass layoffs, if they can not be prevented – 
occurred in all of the studied firms which conducted personnel reductions. Besides of older 
workers with entitlements for a social security benefit, another group of workers released 
from companies were young workers with little professional experience.  
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Interrogated whether they had plans how to replace statutory early retirement options and to 
compensate for the worsened conditions of receipt of pre-retirement benefits, the personnel 
managers pointed to the limited legal leeway of their firm to decide on such issues. The 
personnel manager of Firm PL-6 stated that the company had to adhere to statutory 
regulations and did not have the freedom of decision what measures to apply when workers 
reach a certain amount of working hours, a certain job tenure or age. My impression was 
that Polish firms have adopted the attitude of ´wait and see´. This is connected to the fact 
that many Polish firms in the sample did not deal with the issue of ageing workforce 
before.11 Many firms have not analysed data on the age structure of their workforce and the 
implications stemming from it.  
In situation of mass layoffs, the studied firms however applied financial incentives to make 
early exit attractive despite the decreased level of pre-retirement benefits. A chemical 
company conducted mass layoffs in 1997 and negotiated a social compensation plan with 
trade unions. People selected for dismissals were proposed a severance payment amounting 
to 12 monthly salaries in case they agreed to a cancellation of the employment contract. 
Otherwise, they were dismissed and received only a three-month salary guaranteed by the 
Labour Code. In the course of personnel reductions, mostly older workers left the firm in 
question. „They even calculated they would receive 12 salaries, let one year pass until 
reaching retirement age, and then retire“ (Firm PL-13). The interviewee assumed that 
workers who had had more than one year to retirement had then relied on unemployment 
benefit. (At the time of those personnel reductions, pre-retirement benefits had not yet been 
instituted.) Additionally, the employer reached an agreement with trade unions that released 
workers will receive a jubilee award depending in amount on his/her job tenure. 
A specific situation occurs in Polish power industry. Two utility companies in my sample 
were bought up by a foreign investor. The precondition for the acquisition were 
employment guarantees of seven years.12 The only way to reduce workforce at both firms 
were „plans of voluntary exit“. In Firm PL-9, they were set up in 1999, 2000 and 2004. 
Those packages included incentives for early exit differentiated in amount according to the 
                                                     
11 The personnel manager of a large industrial enterprise admitted: „This issue is quite revolutionary in 
our firm context, I am confronted with it for the first time“ (Firm PL-15).  
12 In Business Week No. 2/2005, employment guarantees were labelled as „Polish input into the 
development of global mergers and acquisitions“ (Szwałek 2005: 10). 
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length of job tenure, as well as re-training measures and transfer opportunities to a 
subsidiary. The personnel manager described the procedure as follows: „There were no 
restrictions on beneficiaries of this programme. [...] Among 60 people who applied for the 
last programme, only one person was young, and the others were workers with early 
retirement opportunities [=entitlements]. Thus, our programme has enabled workers with 
early retirement opportunities to grasp this opportunity with the help of additional financial 
benefits“ (Firm PL-9).  
The 17 firms studied in Poland in spring 2005 have some common traits with regard to exit 
policies and personnel policies towards older workers. Firstly, the situation of constant 
downsizing is typical of Poland as a country with a transforming economy. This clearly 
determines the personnel policy of Polish firms with regard to older workers.13 Secondly, 
those firms which are cutting staff levels resort to older workers as potential for staff 
reductions. Thirdly, early retirement pensions (retirement at age 55 for women, at age 60 for 
male heavy labourers) and early exit pathways (pre-retirement benefits) are commonly 
utilised even if the firm does not downsize staff levels, both at the initiative of the worker 
and of the employer. (The latter two traits resemble strategies applied by the studied 
German firms.) And fourthly, hardly any of the studied Polish companies has plans how to 
deal with excess labour force in future, when enacted reforms on early retirement pensions 
will take full effect, or ideas under what conditions a continued employment of workers past 
the age of 50 would be possible.  
5 Comparison of Externalisation Strategies in German and Polish 
Firms 
Case studies conducted in German and in Polish firms revealed some similarities and some 
differences with regard to their externalisation practice. Older workers who are already 
employed at the firm (´insiders´) are protected from unemployment in Poland and Germany. 
They are not dismissed if they have not yet acquired the right to a social security benefit. In 
a situation of downsizing, which occurred in five German firms and seven Polish firms at 
the time of the interview or shortly before, older workers who have reached the age limit for 
                                                     
13 The high utilisation of pre-retirement benefits in Poland shows that older workers are commonly 
released before reaching statutory retirement age. The number of recipients of pre-retirement benefits 
and pre-retirement allowances (eliminated in 2002) has risen rapidly since their introduction in 1997: 
From 81,000 in 1997 to 489,000 in 2002 (Kabaj 2003: 73). 
 28
 
 
Altersteilzeit (in Germany), early retirement pensions or a pre-retirement pension (in 
Poland), are released in a consensual way or pushed out in the first place. This happens out 
of concern for the job prospects and family responsibilities of younger co-workers and out 
of productivity considerations. A workforce with a high average age is supposed to be less 
creative and physically viable and to pose the risk of knowledge losses when the older age 
groups retire at a stroke. 
Another similarity between exit policies applied by Polish and German firms is the lack of 
recognition of the ageing of the workforce as a strategic issue, with the exception of firms 
which already struggle with problems. Those problems are the trickling-out of firm-specific 
knowledge after older workers retire, the generational gap between experienced workers 
and newly hired young workers (workers in the medium age range are often missing due to 
long-term freezes on hiring) and the difficulty with filling certain positions which require 
newest university qualifications or physical fitness. Thus, if ever, the ageing of the 
workforce is perceived in the first place as a threat, although the solutions devised to avert 
those threats, e.g. health management, might foster the prolongation of working life as a by-
product.  
There is a remarkable difference in the way Polish and German firms transform statutory 
options into exit policies. The difference can be attributed, on the one hand, to available 
statutory options, and on the other hand, to firms´ perception of the legal, financial and 
collective bargaining leeway for independent action. In Germany, statutory early exit 
pathways (Altersteilzeit, until 1988 – Vorruhestand/pre-retirement) require/required the co-
operation of firms, either as financial input or the willingness to hire new staff. Pre-
retirement benefits in Poland, in contrast, require only the cancellation of the employment 
contract. Pre-retirement benefits can however only be utilised if the firm is threatened by 
insolvency, in cases of liquidation of the shop or of the workplace at which the employee 
has hitherto worked. For the utilisation of Altersteilzeit, no such conditions have to be 
fulfilled.  
As far as the perceived legal leeway for exit policy measures is concerned, several of the 
interviewed Polish personnel managers asserted that anti-discrimination rulings enacted as 
the consequence of EU accession inhibited the ability of companies to develop personnel 
policy and exit policy measures which differed by age, e.g. shorter working hours for older 
workers or special exit pathways. Another aspect which inhibits in my eyes the ability of 
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firms to develop firm-based early exit options is the lack of co-operation of collective 
bargaining parties on these issues and the low incidence of branch-wide agreements (comp. 
Mailand/Due 2004: 187). In Germany, by contrast, early retirement pathways often labelled 
´pre-retirement´ (Vorruhestand) are developed in co-operation with collective bargaining 
partners at single plant level, corporate group level and branch level (the latter e.g. in the 
banking sector and in public service). Last but not least, German firms are more viable in 
financial terms and can afford „instrument substitution“ (Casey 1989: 135) to a greater 
extent than Polish firms can do, which struggle with restructuring and downsizing as 
concomitant phenomena of the transformation to market economy. To give one example: 
The largest compensation payment for workers released in mass layoffs in Firm PL-13 
agreed upon with trade unions amounted to 12 monthly salaries. In the studied German 
firms, compensation payments or a monthly pre-retirement salary were usually paid for the 
whole period until reaching retirement or early retirement age.  
6 Future Prospects of Firms´ Externalisation Strategies 
What are the chances that the already enacted or planned labour market and pension 
reforms as described in section 3. will have a bearing on long-term exit policies of Polish 
and German companies? Much depends on the economic development and on the fact how 
bold the legislator will be in pushing through measures which are still vague or which have 
been recently postponed by two years: bridging pensions and early retirement privileges for 
certain occupational groups in the case of Poland; the exemption of older workers from the 
obligation to actively seek work and the shortened period of receipt of the unemployment 
benefit in the case of Germany. To start with Germany: If the economic slump continues, 
firms will need to cut employment levels. It is most probable that those firms in my sample 
which already now exercise costly instrument substitution even as early as at the age of 53 
years in the case of Firm DE-13, will continue with this practice in times of staff cuts, as the 
release of older workers is considered as more humane. Another possible development, 
already envisioned by the personnel manager of Firm DE-14, is that firms will resort to a 
greater extent to the release of younger workers for cost containment purposes. This will 
bring the age structure of firms out of balance, but probably also necessitate them to 
improve working conditions and further vocational training so as to enable for continued 
employment of older workers. Another, less optimistic assumption is that German firms 
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(and Polish firms alike) which do not have the financial means to grant generous 
compensation payments to released older workers to bridge the time to retirement, will “let 
things happen”. The result of that could be an exodus of older workers who can not meet 
job requirements due to physical or psychical burn-out via disability pensions; eventually 
those workers might end up as recipients of social assistance in cases when the disability 
pension is withdrawn (a situation which was reported by the works council of a food-
processing company in Germany). Another possible development in Germany is that firms 
will dismiss older workers after the abolition of the ban on dismissal of long-standing 
workers aged 55 and more by 2006 (codified in SGB III, §147a, see Steffen 2005: 28). This 
development, however, could be stopped by the “social conscience” of the employers and 
by works councils.  
In Poland, the future status of firms´ externalisation policies is overshadowed by a situation 
of uncertainty as to how pre-retirement benefits, early retirement pensions and the 
retirement age for women will evolve. Only one or two Polish respondents regarded the 
debated raising of the retirement age for women to 65 years as a good idea. The other 
interviewees expressed scepticism whether such measures would meet with acceptance of 
the workforce. Here, Polish firms split in two parts – some representatives of firms regarded 
the implementation of a higher retirement age for women and the continued employment of 
older workers as illusory and did not have any plans on how to manage it. The other part 
stated that the firms would then be pressed to keep workers until retirement. Except of 
singular cases, no plans for the improvement of working conditions were devised in order to 
cope with this new situation. (I encountered a similar deprecating attitude in German firms 
when I addressed the topic of raising of retirement age to 67 years.) The interviews revealed 
that in the medium term, the situation of uncertainty generated by the legislator induces 
workers and enterprises to grasp all opportunities of early exit which are still there. Some 
personnel managers wondered how workers can live on the low pre-retirement benefits 
(Firm PL-10). Apparently, older workers who are determined to escape work, be it for 
family, health or other reasons, are willing to reduce their financial claims. Time will show 
whether Polish firms will make use of that determination.  
In my eyes, the successful implementation of retirement policies at firm level will only then 
achieve the desired effect (the reversal of the early exit trend), if 1) firms develop (alone or 
with public subsidies) ideas how to promote the continued employment of older workers, 
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e.g. through health management, flexibilisation of working hours and further vocational 
training; or 2) if the legislator introduces different exit options for white-collar and blue-
collar workers, or for workers in highly burdening and less burdening positions. The latter 
point was stressed by works council members of a metal-manufacturing company in 
Germany. They suggested that early exit options like Altersteilzeit would still be needed for 
workers in highly burdening occupations. They held that the incidence of work-related 
health problems would occur at an earlier age in future due to increased work burden 
because of lower staff levels, due to (anticipated) longer working hours and due to the 
expiry of Altersteilzeit. “[O]lder workers [will] be [...] pushed [...] earlier [...] into illness 
and will be foisted even earlier on the social insurance carriers”, was the opinion of works 
council members in Firm DE-3.14 If older workers with health impediments can not exit via 
an early retirement measure, they will exit into unemployment or sickness (which will be 
also costly for social security systems) or will be forced to continue working regardless of 
the health status. It is safe to claim that that outcome could not be regarded as a successful 
implementation of statutory retirement policies, neither with regard to the financial 
sustainability of social security systems nor with regard to the capacity of older workers for 
self-determination. 
 
                                                     
14 Trafiałek (2003: 235) issued a similar opinion with regard to the situation in Poland and suggested the 
introduction of educational and health policy measures as accompaniment to the discussed rise of the 
statutory retirement age. 
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8 Appendix 
Figure 1: Male employment rate in Germany by age, 1970-2004 
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1970 65,1 86,2 93,7 98,4 98,8 98,3 96,4 94,2 87,5 70,1 17,2
1980 44,5 76,8 84,7 94,2 96,3 96 94,5 90,5 78,3 41,4 6,8
1990 38,4 72,4 79,7 88,2 90 90,5 89,6 85,6 69,9 31,9 4,6
2000 34,4 72 82,3 91,2 92,9 91,5 90,3 85,6 66,8 28,2 4,6
2004 28,9 62,4 74,5 85,4 87,8 87 85,5 81,4 67,9 32,9 4,5
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+
Source: OECD (http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/lfsindicatorsauthenticate.asp). 
Figure 2: Female employment rate in Germany by age, 1970-2004 
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1970 61,8 67,3 49,7 45 46,2 48,5 48,4 43,4 36,1 20,2 6,1
1980 39,9 68,9 60,3 55,3 56,4 54,6 52,4 47,1 37,5 11,8 3,2
1990 32,8 68,3 63,2 58 62,5 62,5 60,5 51,1 35,2 9,8 2,2
2000 25,9 63,8 70,6 70,9 71,3 73,9 72,6 64 45,8 12 1,7
2004 21,8 55,2 85,1 80 67,4 67,7 74,5 78,4 46,9 15,9 1,8
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+
Source: OECD (http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/lfsindicatorsauthenticate.asp). 
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Figure 3: Male employment rate in Poland by age, 1992-2004 
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1992 18,4 59,9 80,7 85,4 84,2 83,7 79,8 71,6 53,7 34,1 18,3
1995 10,5 54,2 82,2 84,3 84,4 81,6 77,4 69,9 52,5 32,0 15,8
2000 8,0 46,3 78,9 84,0 83,0 80,2 74,5 65,5 46,6 27,1 11,8
2004 6,8 37,1 72,1 81,1 82,1 78,2 71,7 61,1 43,7 24,1 9,0
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65 
and 
Source: OECD (http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/lfsindicatorsauthenticate.asp). 
 
Figure 4: Female employment rate in Poland by age, 1992-2004 
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1992 12,2 46,4 56,2 64,2 74,1 76,4 73,7 57,6 33,1 22,5 10,7
1995 6,0 40,9 57,8 64,8 71,9 74,5 72,5 57,5 33,7 18,9 8,3
2000 5,1 37,2 58,2 63,5 69,6 70,0 68,4 54,7 28,5 14,9 5,0
2004 3,7 28 57,5 65,4 69,3 69,6 66,3 50,6 26,4 13,3 4,2
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65 
and 
Source: OECD (http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/lfsindicatorsauthenticate.asp). 
